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INTRODUCTION
If there are hedgehogs and foxes in scholarship, as Isaiah Berlin
opined,1 then Neil Komesar is surely a hedgehog. He has developed a
powerful analytic framework called comparative institutional analysis
that has been of immense value to many foxes. Komesar’s work has had
a huge impact across subject areas, as reflected in this Symposium, from
torts to property, from environmental to constitutional law, from regional
governance in the European Union (EU) to global trade governance in
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The comparative institutional analytic framework advanced by
Komesar makes a simple claim. It contends that the pursuit of any
substantive goal is necessarily mediated through different institutional
processes that will affect outcomes, so that institutional analysis is

*
Gregory Shaffer, Melvin C. Steen Professor, University of Minnesota Law
School. I thank Suzanne Thorpe for her assistance. I take this opportunity to express my
gratitude to Neil Komesar for his friendship and mentorship over the years. I would not
be where I am today without his intellectual contribution and his analytic scrutiny of my
work.
1.
Berlin distinguished those people (foxes) drawn to an infinite variety of
questions and phenomena, and those people (hedgehogs) who view everything in terms
of an all-encompassing system. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY
ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF HISTORY 1–2 (1953) (building from a quote from the
seventh-century Greek poet Archilochus—“The fox knows many things, but
the hedgehog knows one big thing”).
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required and such analysis must be comparative.2 All institutional
processes reflect biases in participation, whether the imperfections are in
the market, the political process, the courts, or otherwise.3 Thus, those
who critique and wish to correct for imperfections in the market through
political intervention must assess, in parallel, imperfections in the
political process.4 Those who critique problems in the political process
and wish to leave decision making to the market must assess, in parallel,
imperfections in the market.5 And those who call for greater or lesser
involvement of courts or greater or lesser judicial deference toward
administrative agencies must assess the relative defects of the judicial
process in relation to those of other institutions.6
Komesar’s analytic framework necessarily calls for close empirical
understanding and microanalysis of institutional processes in particular
contexts. It is such empirical study that is advocated by another tradition
at the University of Wisconsin Law School, law and society scholarship
reflected in a call for a new legal realism.7 New legal realists tend to be
foxes. They aim to assess how law operates in the world, deploying
qualitative and quantitative empirical methods. They assess, in particular,
the interaction of formal law and law’s normativity with other factors in
particular contexts, including the role of power and inequality in law’s
formation and application. For a new legal realist, Victoria Nourse and I
have contended that law cannot be reduced to power or social forces (a
skeptical view sometimes associated with the old legal realism), but
neither can its operation be meaningfully assessed in isolation from
them.8
My core claim in this Article is that comparative institutional
analysis is empty without a new legal realist assessment of how real-life
institutions operate in particular contexts, and that new legal realism is of
2.

See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS

IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3–6 (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY
AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 174–77 (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS].

3.
See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 5–7.
4.
See id. at 22, 112–15.
5.
See id. at 22, 26–27.
6.
See id. at 21–23, 26–27.
7.
See, e.g., Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal
Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 345–56; Stewart Macaulay, The New versus the Old
Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 385,
388–92; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 136–37 (2009).
8.
Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 129, 132; Victoria Nourse & Gregory
Shaffer, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Vices and Virtues of New Legal Realist Theory
and Practice 6–7, 15–16 (Sept. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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no practical use without an analytic framework in which to translate and
organize its findings for purposes of real-life decision making.
Komesar’s participation-centered comparative institutional analytic
framework, I contend, is critical for a new legal realist scholarly agenda
that aims to inform institutional choices. Comparative institutional
analysis and new legal realism are complementary components of any
policy-relevant analysis of law.
Part I briefly presents Komesar’s comparative institutional analytic
framework. Part II compares it with other forms of comparative
institutional analysis used in the social sciences in light of the questions
being asked, and Komesar’s less reductive understanding of law and
institutions. Part III examines the challenge of applying comparative
institutional analysis, which can be critiqued (by some) for being too
narrow in its neoclassical law-and-economics focus on incentives, and
(by others) for being too unwieldy on account of the variables at play.
Part IV discusses why a new legal realism grounded in both empirics and
a subtle understanding of law needs to complement comparative
institutional analysis. Part V presents a brief example of the application
of new legal realist empirics and comparative institutional analysis in
light of the challenges of global governance.
I. KOMESAR’S COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
Komesar provides a conceptual framework for assessing the pursuit
of social goals through alternative social decision-making processes that
inevitably skew decision making in different ways. Goal choice thus
implicates institutional choice. Komesar’s work focuses, in particular, on
the dynamics of participation, direct and indirect, of parties in alternative
institutional settings, whether the market, legislatures, administrative
bodies, or courts, that ultimately shape outcomes.9
All institutions are imperfect because they reflect biases in
participation; therefore, their relative tradeoffs in different contexts must
be compared. Markets reflect informational and other asymmetries,
which provide advantages to certain interests over others.10 Political
processes reflect the influence of organized groups and the self-interest
of representatives.11 Participation in judicial processes is costly and

9.
E.g., KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that
Komesar’s approach to comparative institutional analysis is participation-centered);
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasizing the importance of the
dynamics of participation to comparative institutional analysis).
10.
See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 100–05.
11.
See id. at 54–55, 58–64.
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time-consuming, often advantaging the haves over the have nots,12 and,
in any case, courts have limited resources to hear all relevant claims in
increasingly complex and rapidly changing societies.13
Biases, moreover, can take different forms, reflecting (in ideal-type
terms) what Komesar calls minoritarian and majoritarian biases.14 Public
choice and interest group theories of politics reflect concerns over
minoritarian biases in politics—think of discrete interest groups drafting
statutes that legislators sponsor. Theories of asymmetric information
reflect concerns over minoritarian biases in markets. Yet, as Komesar
notes, we also need to be concerned about majoritarian biases in which
majorities fail to take account of the adverse impacts of policy choices on
discrete minorities.15 Majorities in the United States, for example, had
justifiable concerns about enhancing their security after 9/11, but
minorities experienced the policies’ impacts most severely. Majority
decision making in the market may also have asymmetric adverse
consequences on minorities, such as for people of color seeking housing,
or for particular localities subject to environmental hazards where goods
are produced for the market.
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis provides a framework
that is useful for both positive and normative analysis. From a positive
perspective, it focuses attention on how decision making occurs in
different institutional contexts as a function of the dynamics of
participation within them, which helps us to predict likely biases in
outcomes from those processes. Normatively, it helps us evaluate choices
over the allocation of decision making to markets, courts, and political
and administrative bodies, whatever the goal may be, including that of
inclusiveness in determining goal choice. There may be parallels in the
pathologies of decision making in different institutions, but these
parallels are never identical. Thus, the pursuit of any goal must involve
not only institutional analysis regarding the defects of any particular
institution, but also comparative analysis of the relative deficiencies of
one institutional process compared with other real life institutional
alternatives.
Most pointedly, Komesar insists that from a policy perspective we
cannot meaningfully assess the attributes and deficiencies of one
institutional process—beset by resource, informational, and other

12.
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124–25 (1974).
13.
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 35, 37–38.
14.
For definitions of minoritarian versus majoritarian bias, see KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 56–57.
15.
Id. at 81.
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asymmetries—without reference to other institutions that may well be
subject to similar (but not identical) dynamics.16 He thus most
vehemently critiques single institutional analysis, whether of the
normative autism of markets stipulated in neoclassical economics, the
“sausage-making” of self-interested legislators, or the Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce endless delays and obfuscation of lawyer-driven judicial
review.17 Neither the market nor the political process, neither
administrative bodies nor the courts, offer a simple solution. Thus,
single-institutional critiques of any one of them, calling for allocation of
decision making to another, is both deficient and misleading. Any
meaningful analysis for public policy purposes must address institutional
processes comparatively.
II. VARIETIES OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Komesar is not the only one to call his or her framework
comparative institutional analysis. Do a search of the term and you will
find completely different literatures grounded in institutional
economics,18 comparative politics,19 and economic sociology.20 Those
within the legal academy who use or reference Komesar’s framework,
moreover, also differ in important ways. Some turn to a deductive
approach based on game theory (such as Adrian Vermeule),21 while
others call for a contextualized, empirically grounded approach (such as
Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer).22 Some focus on efficiency as the

16.
Id. at 5–6.
17.
See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 14–15 (Stephen Gill ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1996) (1853).
18.
See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 2–3, 377 (2001); AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 4–5 (2006); DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990)
[hereinafter NORTH, INSTITUTIONS]; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 1, 5 (2005).
19.
See, e.g., James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, Preface to EXPLAINING
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER xi, xii (James Mahoney &
Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010) (providing a historical institutionalist perspective); Glenn
Morgan et al., Introduction to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 1, 2–3 (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., 2010); Kathleen Thelen, Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369, 369–71 (1999).
20.
See, e.g., JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION
2–3 (2004) (providing an institutional sociology perspective).
21.
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 145 (2006).
22.
E.g., Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 129–32.
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underlying comparative measure (such as Daniel Cole23 and Joel
Trachtman24), while others focus on the dynamics of participation (such
as Miguel Maduro,25 Gregory Shaffer,26 and Komesar himself27). In my
view, Komesar’s participation-based, factually contextualized approach
is the better way to proceed for both positive and normative analysis.
When social scientists hear of comparative institutional analysis
they tend to think of new institutional economics as reflected in the work
of Oliver Williamson or Douglass North. For North, institutions
represent the “rules of the game” under which economic activity occurs
within a given society.28 Similarly, for political scientists and
sociologists, such as Kathleen Thelen and John Campbell, the term
comparative institutional analysis is used to compare institutions in terms
of the rules of the game across societies.29 Komesar, in contrast, views
institutions in terms of different social decision-making processes, such
as legislatures, courts, and markets.
These definitional starting points are useful for different questions.
North’s conception of institutions is useful for addressing macro
questions such as why certain societies have experienced greater
economic growth than others. The key questions become how do
particular rules of the game emerge and change, and what are their
implications for economic activity since these rules of the game facilitate
and constrain economic activity. Similarly, comparative political
scientists and institutional sociologists address macro-level questions
23.
See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 887, 888.
24.
E.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the
International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470, 518–19 (1997).
25.
E.g., MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998); Miguel Poiares Maduro,
From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: A Constitutional Approach for Global
Governance, in 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 227, 227 (Douglas
Lewis ed., 2006).
26.
E.g., Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement:
Why Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 1, 4 (2008).
27.
E.g., KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that
Komesar’s approach to comparative institutional analysis is participation-centered);
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasizing the importance of the
dynamics of participation to comparative institutional analysis).
28.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 3. Douglass North defines
“institution” in a top-down way in terms of “any form of constraint that human beings
devise to shape human interaction.” Id. at 4.
29.
See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 6–7; Thelen, supra note 19, at 389, 398.
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such as why some countries have adopted particular policies regarding
relations between capital and labor compared to others. Like Komesar,
these latter scholars are interested in legislatures, courts, and markets, but
they assess them in terms of the overall rules of the game of a society,
such as those that distinguish corporatist, consociational democracies,
and neoliberal governance systems.
Komesar’s starting point, in contrast, is more useful for
microanalysis of decision making in particular case-specific, factual
contexts. He applies his framework to such questions as institutional
alternatives for addressing the tensions between economic activity and
environmental pollution reflected in the famous Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co.30 case,31 and between community development, racial
diversity, access to housing, and associational decision making reflected
in the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in the Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 32 case regarding zoning.33
His approach is particularly useful for lawyers and legal academics
assessing the institutional implications of judicial interpretive choices in
discrete cases, and in judicial doctrine that has broader social
repercussions. It is likewise useful for assessing alternative design of
primary and secondary legal rules in light of their implications for
subsequent social decision making.
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis places law and law’s
contingencies front and center, and differs in this way from the
generalized treatment of law in much of the social sciences. In terms of
debates within the legal academy, he addresses law not from a formal
perspective, but from that of the law in action, and in particular the way
in which social decision-making processes shape law’s meaning and
effects. In sum, his approach does not reduce law—whether in terms of
legal formalism or of the “rules of the game”—but openly acknowledges
the contingencies of law and legal interpretation that need to be
pragmatically assessed by anyone interested in the law’s effects in
particular contexts.
Komesar’s approach also differs from new institutional economics
in terms of his focus on the dynamics of participation within institutions
that affect the pursuit of any social goal as opposed to a focus on
resource allocation efficiency (RAE). Williamson and his followers
propose that individuals, firms, and states select institutional devices in
order to maximize welfare benefits net of transaction costs and strategic
30.
31.
32.
33.

309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 14–27.
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
See KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 79–86.
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costs.34 A number of legal scholars use Komesar’s version of
comparative institutional analysis within an RAE law-and-economics
framework. Cole, for example, insists on the need for welfare-based
measurements in his presentation of comparative institutional analysis,
with a particular focus on property law.35 Trachtman similarly takes such
an approach to assess institutional tradeoffs in global and WTO
governance from a constitutional economics perspective.36 In contrast,
Komesar’s approach focuses on the dynamics of participation and, while
taking efficiency concerns seriously, remains agnostic about the
particular substantive goal pursued. In light of the wide diversity of
priorities, perspectives, and goals at stake regarding most governance
matters, and the bounded character of rationality,37 it seems
presumptuous to prescribe a single goal for the evaluation of all policy
contexts. In this sense, Komesar’s approach can be viewed as
incorporating a form of value pluralism, to refer once more to the work
of Isaiah Berlin.38
Nonetheless, as Komesar has argued and as I have applied elsewhere
with Trachtman, these two approaches (welfare-based and
participatory-based) are related and not necessarily opposed.39
34.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); see
also Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the
WTO, 52 VA. J INT’L L. 103, 107 (2011).
35.
DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS
28–29 (2d ed. 2011); Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private
Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (2007).
36.
See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 24, at 555 (identifying efficiency in
meeting state preferences as a metric for comparison).
37.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (studying “the psychology of
intuitive beliefs and choices and examin[ing] their bounded rationality”); Herbert A.
Simon, Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 125, 132–33
(1991).
38.
As Berlin writes:
Pluralism, with the measure of “negative” liberty that it entails, seems to me a
truer and more humane ideal . . . . It is truer, because it does, at least,
recognise the fact that human goals are many, not all of them
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.
ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 216 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
39.
For further explication, see Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law,
Participation and Institutional Choice (Two Ways), in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165, 170 (Sandra Batie & Nicholas Mercuro eds.,
2008) (“[P]articipation is the heart of key economics concepts such as transaction costs,
externalities and resource allocation efficiency. Transaction costs are the costs of market
participation. Externalities are failures of market participation where missing transactions
give rise to allocative decisions that do not reflect all costs and benefits. Resource
allocation efficiency is defined by transaction costs and violated by externalities and is,
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Participation lies at the center of neoclassical economists’ concern with
resource allocation efficiency, whether in terms of supply and demand
curves, market distortions through monopolistic and oligopolistic
behavior, information asymmetries and information manipulations, or
“public choice” effects on government decision making. The different
dynamics of participation characterizing different institutional fora will
determine the pursuit of a particular social goal, including that of
resource allocation efficiency or whatever bundle of goals might be
promoted.
Finally, there is a key difference between Komesar’s application of
his framework that calls for analysis of particular contexts and those who
apply it in a deductive way resulting in single, cross-cutting
recommendations regarding legal interpretation. Vermeule notably
acknowledges the importance of comparative institutional analysis given
the different “capacities of interpreters and . . . the systemic effects of
interpretive approaches.”40 Yet Vermeule ultimately calls for a no frills
textualism in judicial interpretation based on rational-choice decision
theory.41 He concedes that comparative institutional analysis depends on
empirics, but maintains that empirical work cannot help courts because
of the problem of “trans-science” (the limits of social science) so that,
although the resolution of interpretive debates is “empirical in principle,”
it is “intractable in practice.”42 He turns to decision theory to maintain
that judges should limit themselves to textualist reasoning and generally
defer to other branches of government. He thus makes a single
institutional choice for all cases, regardless of context, maintaining
“[w]here texts are intrinsically ambiguous, the legal system does best if
judges assign the authority to interpret those texts to other
institutions . . . [such as] administrative agencies . . . [or] legislatures.”43
therefore, a participation-based notion.”); and Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 34, at
108.
40.
VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 2.
41.
Id. at 80–81 (discussing second-best accounts of interpretation); id. at 171
(discussing decision theory under uncertainty). Vermeule also discusses and applies
cost-benefit analysis, the “principle of insufficient reason,” the “maximin criterion,” the
importance of “picking” a clear rule, and the desirability of “fast and frugal heuristics.”
Id. at 171–80; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 46 (1994)
(“[G]ame theory shares its basic premises with classical economics.”).
42.
VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 162. For example, Vermeule cites the
empirical work of William Eskridge as the best available, but then rejects it because of
the limits of empirical studies. Id. at 159–61 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991)). For
Vermeule, such empirical work suffers from a “fallacy of composition: the assumption
that a feature true of a subset of cases will hold true when generalized to all cases.” Id. at
161.
43.
Id. at 4.
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Komesar, in contrast, although he is quite skeptical of courts as panaceas
and thus implicitly critiques much liberal legal scholarship,44 recognizes
the parallel defects in legislative and administrative processes so that any
meaningful analysis must be comparative in a more contextualized
manner.

III. THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
Although I am a great advocate of Komesar’s approach, it raises
significant challenges for those wishing to apply it. On the one hand, it
can be critiqued for being too narrow in its predominant focus on
incentives and thus fails to capture that institutions are independent
actors with their path dependencies and taken-for-granted ways. On the
other hand, it can be critiqued for being too openended for meaningful
analysis because it includes too many variables, some of which are
endogenous to each other.
First, Komesar’s framework can be viewed as relatively narrow,
coming from a University of Chicago neoclassical law-and-economics
perspective that focuses on law as a price and participation in
cost-benefit terms, which together affect outcomes. Within his
framework, he addresses rational-choice factors affecting participation
such as per capita stakes in outcomes, transaction costs, and collective
action challenges. Surely these factors are critical and I highlight them in
my work. Yet the framework can be critiqued because it does not take
account of institutions as independent actors that “think” in particular
ways, to take from the cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas.45
Institutional epistemologies and path dependencies can be viewed
through a participation lens as products of the costs and benefits of
participation, but such epistemologies and path dependencies can be
powerful and difficult to change when they become entrenched. From
this perspective, institutions reflect repeated patterns that inform their
behavior, which is notably the case with the institutions that administer
and implement law. As Elizabeth Mertz writes, “[l]egal institutions speak
to other institutions using law’s fundamental ‘grammar,’ and those who
must interpret the resulting legal directives receive these messages

44.
See KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2.
45.
See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986); ANTHONY GIDDENS,
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984).
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through the filter of their own institutions’ priorities and discourses.”46
Similarly, in matters of global governance, constructivist international
relations theorists Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore show how
institutions create patterns of perceiving matters and acting upon them
that independently affect outcomes.47 In this sense, allocating issues to
different institutions will give rise to outcomes that do not simply reflect
dynamics of participation within an institution, but also embedded
institutional cultures—the way the institution itself thinks.
Comparative institutional analysis can nonetheless be applied to
take account of institutional norms, building from a microanalysis of
institutions. In this vein, Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have argued
that we need a complementary “phenomenology of institutional thought”
to understand “how individual human beings, on the basis of their own
thoughts and actions, are shaped by their institutional context, and how,
in turn, they shape that context in response to changing circumstances or
conceptualizations.”48 In an important article engaging with Komesar’s
framework, Rubin calls for a synthesis of law and economics and social
theory that will give rise to “a new, unified methodology for legal
scholarship based on the analysis of institutions.”49 In doing so, Rubin
stresses that “[t]he one element of legal process theory that was not

46.
Elizabeth Mertz, Language Structure and Law School Reform (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Here, actors within such different
institutions work within different cognitive and discursive frames that require some forms
of translation for other institutional contexts.
47.
See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004).
48.
Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1989, 1994 (1996). This microanalysis of institutions should also address private
organizations as well, building on neoinstitutional insights from sociology as applied to
law. Sociological neoinstituionalism assesses how institutions work and have social
effects. See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 1–19 (1989); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983) (studying the causes of
bureaucratization and organizational change); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional
Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
47, 75 (1992); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977) (studying the formal
structures of organizations in postindustrial society); see also Arthur T. Denzau &
Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3
(1993) (integrating analysis of shared mental models and ideologies of actors).
49.
Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (1996).
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explicitly attacked by law and economics or critical legal studies was the
call for comparative institutional analysis.”50
In addition, Komesar works with institutions in ideal-type
terms—assessing the political process, the market process, and the
judicial process as institutional alternatives. He thus does not explicitly
address the central role of administrative agencies in contemporary
governance,51 nor variation in private forms of governance. He also does
not address the critical issue of variation in institutional design and the
importance of institutional innovation in a rapidly changing world,
although his analytic framework can be used to assess institutional
design issues.52
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis can also be critiqued
for being too static in its analysis, because allocations of authority to a
particular institution spur reactions by other institutions that give rise to
dynamic and recursive institutional interaction over time. William
Eskridge has developed a dynamic theory of statutory interpretation
based on such institutional interaction.53 Like Vermeule, Eskridge works
with game theory but complements it with empirical work. He presents
evidence showing that judicial overrides are more likely to occur if
judges adopt formalist “plain meaning” decisions, thus indicating that
formalist readings are more likely to contradict congressional purpose
and therefore be “countermajoritarian.”54
In parallel, Terrence Halliday has developed a theory of the
recursivity of law that explicitly addresses different factors that may give
rise to recursive interactions between institutions over time.55 Halliday
focuses on four factors: (1) differences in actors’ diagnosis of a
“problem” that law is to address, (2) differences in participation of those
who devise law and those who implement it, (3) contradictions within the
50.
Id. at 1403.
51.
William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411.
52.
See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making:
The Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 629, 634 (2004);
Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 34.
53.
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010).
54.
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 53, at 159–61 (citing Eskridge, supra
note 42). See Eskridge’s review of Vermeule’s book in William N. Eskridge, Jr., No
Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2059 (2006) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra
note 21) (finding Vermeule’s book to suffer from “agency nirvana”).
55.
See Terrence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law:
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate
Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007).
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law, and (4) indeterminacies in the law.56 All of these factors trigger the
dynamic interaction of institutions. Those actors who prevail at the stage
of diagnosis in lawmaking may face considerable implementation
challenges because other institutions will frame the problem in other
ways. The interests of actors that wield power in the implementation of
legal norms may not have been represented at the enactment stage, again
triggering implementation difficulties that catalyze new cycles of legal
norm making. Contradictions and indeterminacies in the law may reflect
differences among actors or unconsidered issues that will need to be
resolved, so that these actors once again spur new cycles of legal norm
making to address ongoing problems.
All of these factors are quite important for understanding how law
operates in the world and they can be incorporated in Komesar’s
framework. Yet raising them brings to the fore a countervailing concern
with the breadth of the framework, leading to challenges in applying it
when decision makers must decide in a timely manner. As the legal
realist Max Radin wrote:
Judges are people and the economizing of mental effort is a
characteristic of people, even if censorious persons call it by a
less fine name. . . . [A] judge[,] economic of mental effort, may
decline to disturb [his initial sense of a case] by searching for
new elements which might compel the substitution of a wholly
different situation.57
Applying Komesar’s framework is beset by challenges in this
respect. To start, Komesar’s two-force model of politics rightfully raises
concerns about the challenges of both majoritarian and minoritarian bias.
Sometimes it may be clear which is present. But at other times, these
concerns may cut in different ways. The analysis may simply reflect the
conceptual frame used to assess dynamics of participation. In my area of
international trade law, political economists conventionally view
protectionism as a reflection of the problem of minoritarian bias. Free
trade advocates thus call for international law and institutions to help
overcome domestic political malfunctions.58 But liberal trade policy can
also have distributive implications that impose severe costs on a few to
the benefit of the many, raising the potential challenge of majoritarian
bias. One can attempt to devise policies to compensate the losers, but
56.
Id. at 1149–53.
57.
Max Radin, Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A.
J. 357, 362 (1925).
58.
See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000).
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implementing them in practice typically does not occur. Trade law also
implicates nontrade values, such as environmental, cultural, and
developmental concerns that may be quite localized and not taken into
account in global decision making.59 The resulting incommensurability
of values will make any normative conclusion difficult to assess, whether
in terms of goal choice (such as in welfare analysis) or institutional
choice (such as which institution is less biased from the standpoint of
participation).
In addition, it is not always clear if the dynamics of participation or
institutional choice or institutions should be viewed as the independent,
intervening, or dependent variables in Komesar’s framework. For
example, in applying the framework, is institutional choice the
independent variable that determines law (the dependent variable)?60 Or,
to the contrary, is the dynamics of participation the independent variable
that shapes institutional choice (the dependent variable) in light of
strategic behavior?61 Or alternatively, is the dynamics of participation the
independent variable that determines law as the rules of the game, the
(dependent variable)?62 Each of these possibilities is reflected in different
aspects of Komesar’s and others’ work on comparative institutional
analysis because, on the one hand, the operation of institutions depends
on the dynamics of participation within them and, on the other hand,
institutions shape and constrain participation. These alternative options
nonetheless raise questions regarding the direction of causation being
assessed, thus creating the problem of endogeneity for the testing of any
model. As a result, Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis should
be viewed as an analytic framework and not as a theoretical model.
In distinguishing his approach from that of traditional institutional
economists, Komesar has maintained that, from a positive perspective,
his interest lies in a bottom-up analysis of how the dynamics of
59.
In this sense, what constitutes an illegitimate “trade barrier” is a social
construction, reflecting different perspectives of different constituencies in different
societies in light of their interests and social contexts.
60.
Komesar’s work advocates the key role of comparative institutional
analysis because institutional choice allocates decision making to different institutions
(which can be viewed as an intervening variable) characterized by different dynamics of
participation that thus affects outcomes.
61.
Political scientists such as E.E. Schattschneider have assessed how the
exercise of institutional power consists of the mobilization of bias. See, e.g., E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 1975); see also Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of
Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 952 (1962); Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz,
Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 632, 641
(1963).
62.
Komesar at times has depicted his approach in this vein, as noted below.
See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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participation in institutions shapes law—the third alternative conception
laid out above. As he writes:
The real difference between traditional institutional economic
analysis and my version of institutional analysis, however, lies
less in definition and more in the direction of causation. For
traditional institutional economists like Allan Schmid, laws,
rules and customs determine the dynamics of participation and,
therefore, the degree of influence and power. . . . For new
institutionalists like Douglass North, the role of property rights
and the direction of causation is the same (even if the
performance measure now emphasizes resource allocation
efficiency rather than distribution). . . . In my approach, law is
a function of participation which is in turn a function of the
costs and benefits of participation and factors like numbers and
complexity. Law is the dependent variable and endogenous to
the analysis. That participation is also a function of rules is
secondary.63
By taking such a position, Komesar opens up, from a positive
perspective, the study of how institutions shape law in different ways.
From a normative perspective, however, Komesar also contends that
some institutional choices are better than others because of the dynamics
of participation in the institution to which authority is allocated.64 This is
why he insists that institutional analysis must be comparative. He thus
suggests that decision makers, such as judges, can have some autonomy
in making institutional choices and they should exercise it in a way
informed by comparative institutional analysis. These two
perspectives—one positive focused on the dynamics of participation and
the other normative focused on an evaluation of decision making—can
be reconciled because of their different orientations: descriptive and
evaluative. Yet they also illustrate how the dynamics of participation and
institutional choices dynamically interact. Although social scientists may
find only the positive aspect of Komesar’s work of interest, the work’s
normative implications particularly interest the legal community. Once
again, because of its mix of positive and normative analysis, Komesar’s
approach should be viewed as an analytic framework and not a
theoretical model.
63.
See Komesar, supra note 39, at 166–67.
64.
As noted earlier, Komesar’s approach remains agnostic regarding
substantive normative goals. Its main point is that regardless of one’s normative goal, one
needs to address how the goal’s pursuit will be mediated by institutions, affecting
outcomes, so that institutional choice is critical.
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Komesar’s framework should itself be subject to comparative
analysis in relation to rival positive and normative frameworks. In my
view, Komesar’s framework is not easy to apply, but it is superior to
simpler frameworks based on gross assumptions that predetermine the
analysis—such as the assumptions made in some applications of
neoclassical law and economics criticized by Judge Richard Posner
himself at the start of the 2008 financial crisis.65 It is likewise superior to
more complicated approaches that give little analytic leverage in
concrete cases—such as the broader skeptical claims regarding law in
some of the critical legal studies literature.
Komesar’s framework is important because it helps to orient what to
look for in understanding, making, and evaluating decisions about law. It
provides a middle ground between what Arthur Leff called the desert of
law and economics and the swamp of law and society.66 From a
pragmatist perspective, we need a way to organize an assessment of
policy in a world characterized by increasing complexity and volatility,
and a growing number of diverse stakeholders affected by policy. One
way to do so is to make presumptions and cross-the-board conclusions
from simple models. Another option is to do what the legal realists did,
which was to create narrower context-specific categories that help to
orient legal analysis.67

65.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 260 (2009) (“The depression is a failure of capitalism, or
more precisely of a certain kind of capitalism (‘laissez-faire’ in a loose sense, ‘American’
versus ‘European’ in a popular sense) . . . .”); id. at 267 (“Many economists have been
converted—virtually overnight—from being Milton Friedman monetarists to being J.M.
Keynes deficit spenders . . . .”). Judge Richard Posner also noted in a Federalist Society
address, “[y]ou can have rationality and you can have competition, and you can still have
disasters.” Press Release, Columbia Law School, Judge Posner on the Economic Crisis
(Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/
news_events/2008/november2008/posner; see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J.
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 5 (2009) (“This book is derived from a different
view of how economics should be described. The economics of the textbooks seeks to
minimize as much as possible departures from pure economic motivation and from
rationality.”).
66.
As Ellickson wrote, “[t]he late Arthur Leff, who read extensively in both,
saw law-and-economics as a desert and law-and-society as a swamp.” ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 147 (1991). A
similar comment could be made in terms of empirical methods.
67.
See Mathew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 191, 197–98 (2009).
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IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF A NEW LEGAL REALISM
As Victoria Nourse and I have argued elsewhere, applying
Komesar’s framework should be part of what we call a new legal realist
approach.68 New legal realism provides a necessary complement that
grounds comparative institutional analysis in empirical work. Such
empirical work should inform comparative institutional analysis
regarding the implications of different institutional choices.
New legal realism grows out of the old legal realist movement that
was particularly active in the 1920s and 1930s and that responded to
what it viewed as formalist legal scholarship.69 Legal realists argued,
among other matters, for the need to study the context in which law is
made, operates, and has effects before making any proposition about
what a law means or should do. As Karl Llewellyn maintained, “[t]he
argument is simply that no judgment of what Ought to be done in the
future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without
knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now
doing.”70 Llewellyn called for “[t]he temporary divorce of Is and Ought
for purposes of study.”71
What is particularly “new” in new legal realism is first that it
engages in empirical work and second that it engages in critical
self-reflection of its empirical endeavors. While the old legal realists
called for greater empirical work so that the practice (and thus meaning)
of law would be better understood, they were less accomplished in
practicing what they preached.72 In addition, although the empirical study
of law lies at the heart of the new legal realist scholarly commitment, a
new legal realism should take into account critical, epistemological
challenges to factual and legal constructions. Critical legal theories have

68.
Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 127–36.
69.
Legal realism has many variants and, in large part, can be viewed in terms
of a scholarly reaction to classical, formalist legal theory and practice. For different
assessments of Legal Realism, see, for example, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W.
Fisher et al. eds., 1993) (including classic texts of legal realists and their antecedents);
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1995); and Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds., 2005) (explaining the author’s view of legal realism’s core claim).
70.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236–37 (1931).
71.
Id. at 1236.
72.
See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 7, at 375 (“The classic realists talked about
doing empirical research, but relatively little was accomplished.”).
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made us more scrutinizing of objective presentations of “law” and
“fact.”73
New legal realism, nonetheless, is relatively better positioned than
formalist and deductive analysis (based on assumptions) to show how
presentations of law and fact are not equal. Although a new legal realist
approach recognizes that “social science” is never entirely “correct,” it
advocates empirical study because it is the best way for us to proceed
toward a better understanding of the world in which law operates. This
perspective lies at the core of Deweyan pragmatism that rejects “the idea
of complete objectivity,” but “insist[s] on the need for a scientific study
of social problems.”74 A new legal realist approach contends that
researchers need to be vigilant of biases that reflect their own
backgrounds and social contexts. What new legal realism takes from
critical perspectives is to engage in more reflexive examination of bias,
but in the service of relatively more objective empirical study.
A new legal realism is important for engaging in comparative
institutional analysis in two respects. First, it helps us to develop
conditional theory regarding the conditions under which law is made and
has effects. By conditional theory, I refer to theory built from
methodological approaches that seek to understand variation regarding
law’s development and role in different contexts.75 The role of

73.
See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57
(1984) (going beyond a critique of formalism as legitimization, and critiquing the legal
realists for their functionalism and the presumption of inevitability and the blindness
toward domination that it entails); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1401 (1996) (“As Horkheimer and Adorno, the founders of the Frankfurt School,
observe, claims of neutrality are designed to mask the exercise of power, to communicate
a pseudo-scientific methodology that disables people from perceiving the possibility of
rebellion or dissent.” (citing MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 20–23 (John Cumming trans., 1972))); David M. Trubek & John Esser,
“Critical Empiricism” in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora’s
Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3 (1989) (rejecting “universal scientism”). For the
viewpoints of legal realists, see, for example, JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH
AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 14, 23 (1949) (“Facts are guesses . . . . The trial
court’s facts are not ‘data,’ not something that is ‘given’; they are not waiting
somewhere, ready made, for the court to discover, to ‘find.’”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 106 (2d ed. 1963) (“Judges, we are advised, are far more likely to
differ among themselves on ‘questions of fact’ than on ‘questions of law . . . .’”). For a
philosophical investigation of these issues, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALITY (1995).
74.
See Patricia Ewick et al., Introduction to SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY,
AND THE LAW 1, 3 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999) (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR
CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 24 (1960)).
75.
See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International
Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
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conditional theory is reflected in the legal realists’ development of
factually contextualized categories for understanding legal doctrine.76
Likewise, empirically grounded conditional theory is critical for
engaging in comparative institutional analysis in a world of high
numbers and complexity and limited time for making decisions.
Complementarily, new legal realism is important for developing
emergent analytics that upsets prior assumptions and predispositions that
turn out to be wrong. By emergent analytics, Nourse and I mean
analytics through which researchers can reassess their analytic priors so
that new understandings can emerge.77 For a new legal realist, methods
should not only aim to explain variation, but also must be careful not to
simply reconfirm analytic priors. Qualitative methods, such as fieldwork,
can be particularly beneficial in this respect. A participation-oriented
comparative institutional analysis is linked to the idea of emergent
analytics in that it recognizes that the dynamics of participation in
different institutional processes give rise to quite different analytics.
V. APPLYING COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND NEW
LEGAL REALISM: THE EXAMPLE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The main challenge of comparative institutional analysis lies in
applying it. Such comparative institutional analysis will always be
imperfect, but we know, at a minimum, that it will be superior to single
institutional critiques. It is for us, in different domains, to use it to help
orient meaningful analysis that is pragmatically grounded.
Comparative institutional analysis will need to be increasingly used
as part of a new legal realism in assessing international and transnational
legal ordering. A great deal of my work has applied comparative
institutional analysis in assessing decision making in global governance,
with special attention on the WTO in light of the implications of its
dispute settlement system.78 Comparative institutional analysis is
particularly important in the context of global trade governance given
that constituencies of different countries at different levels of
development have widely varying priorities, perceptions, and abilities to
be heard.
76.
Stephenson, supra note 67, at 197–99.
77.
Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 8.
78.
See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A
Comparative Institutional Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130 (Michael
Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005) [hereinafter Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the
WTO]; Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist
World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2012); Shaffer, supra note 26; Shaffer & Trachtman,
supra note 34.
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From a new legal realist perspective, in the international trade law
context, academics in the United States are particularly well-placed to
participate in international policy framing because they write from the
center of global power, not only economically, but also socially and
linguistically, including in terms of the relative status of U.S.
universities. Their presentations of “law” and “fact” are more likely to
reflect their backgrounds and the priorities and perspectives of those with
whom they most frequently engage. The very process of engaging in
empirical work, especially that which takes us into the field to engage
with others with whom we otherwise have no contact, inevitably pushes
us beyond our initial assumptions, so that we listen to other voices and
perspectives.79
Let me give a brief example of how my perspectives on
international trade law issues were changed through engaging in
fieldwork. As a beginning academic, I obtained a National Science
Foundation grant to examine the political economy of trade-environment
issues and went to Geneva with a conventional conception (within the
U.S. academic context) that the WTO was trade-biased and needed to
balance competing environmental norms and objectives. I soon learned
how much more complex the issues were. Interviews turned into lectures
from developing country representatives and civil society groups about
how my questions reflected a northern frame. I learned about how
environmental issues, and thus the trade-environment debate, was
constructed (and being constructed) differently by U.S. and European
representatives, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academics
than by their developing country counterparts, with the United States and
Europeans having the advantage of the resources and status that U.S. and
European universities bring, and greater access to Western media and
learned journals. I learned how the term “environment” has vastly
different meanings to stakeholders in developing countries where it is
much more difficult to separate the concept from that of “development,”
because people’s livelihoods are more intimately connected on a
day-to-day basis with the environment.80 My assumptions and
79.
See, e.g., Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism,
Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and
Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479, 483–84 (insisting on “the power of social science
methodology to push us beyond our personal politics or situations, to enforce a form of
humility in which we must listen to voices other than our own”).
80.
See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment
Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61–68 (2001). For an assessment of the different
treatment of the environment in the United Kingdom and India, see GRAHAM CHAPMAN
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE MASS MEDIA: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE xiv (1997)
(noting the different perceptions of the word “environment” in Britain and India, and that
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expectations were upset by the experience of weeks of interviewing and
discussing the issues with people coming from a much broader range of
experience and priorities.
I then reviewed the minutes of WTO trade and environment
committee meetings and minutes of meetings that the WTO organized
with stakeholders to check what I heard in interviews. I tabulated and
assessed who spoke at these meetings on which issues and in which ways
to illustrate that one could not simply construct trade and environment
issues along a pro-trade/pro-environment, or pro-business/pro-civil
society dichotomous frame, as depicted in the U.S. media and much of
U.S. scholarly literature. The data showed how government
representatives from northern and southern countries distinctly framed
trade-environment issues.81 Civil society advocates from the north and
south largely aligned with the frames used by the respective government
representatives. In particular, U.S. and European Union (EU)
stakeholders and government representatives tended to frame
environmental issues in a preservationist manner, while southern
stakeholders and government representatives tended to frame them
within a developmental lens regarding the intersection of human
communities and natural habitats.82
From the perspective of the interpretation of WTO rules in the
judicial process, this work made me much more cautious in advocating
particular interpretive choices of WTO rules. To give an example,
arguably the most famous case in WTO law, known as the U.S.
shrimp-turtle case, involved a U.S. ban of imports of shrimp from a
number of South and Southeast Asian countries on the grounds that they
did not require large shrimp trawlers to use devices that permit
endangered sea turtles to escape from nets.83 To study the background to
that case, I obtained funding to travel to Thailand which was the country
most affected by the U.S. ban. I interviewed government officials, NGO
activists, and marine biologists, and visited the beaches where sea turtles
nested, a port where shrimp trawlers were based, and shrimp farms. I
learned of completely different perspectives of the issues where those
living by the beaches made less than a dollar a day and had incentives to
in India, because many people’s livelihood is directly connected to the environment, “it is
difficult to separate it from development”). For an examination of environmentalism from
a wide variety of perspectives, see BUCKNELL REVIEW, WORLDVIEWS AND ECOLOGY
(Mary Evelyn Tucker & John A. Grim eds., 1993).
81.
See Shaffer, supra note 80, at 44–52.
82.
Id. at 66.
83.
Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); see also Shaffer, Power, Governance,
and the WTO, supra note 78, at 2, 7–8.
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steal turtle eggs, where luxury hotels visited by Westerners destroyed sea
turtle nesting habitat, and where shrimp farmers committed suicide when
their investments were wiped out over night by the U.S. ban in which the
United States provided almost no transition period nor any funding for
the increased environmental regulatory demands on which it insisted to
protect sea turtles in Asian waters. This empirical work fed into my
analysis of the comparative institutional choices available for interpreting
WTO law applying in this case and assessing the choices ultimately
made by the WTO Appellate Body.84 Importantly, the WTO Appellate
Body did not simply defer to the U.S. position on environmental
protection grounds, but rather interpreted WTO rules in a way to induce
the United States to correct biases in the application of its law and
procedures that had worked to the detriment of affected foreigners.85
CONCLUSION
Scholars and decision makers need an analytic framework in which
to assess the information that empirical study generates. Komesar
provides such a framework with his version of comparative institutional
analysis. In the case of my work, a comparative institutional analytic
framework that is participation-centered helps to situate law and policy
conflicts in social and institutional context, recognizing that
constituencies of different countries at different levels of development
have widely varying priorities, perceptions, and abilities to be heard.
Komesar’s framework needs to be complemented by an empirically
grounded, new legal realist approach regarding how law is translated in
different institutional contexts. In this way, new analytics can emerge
that will update and inform comparative institutional analysis in a
dynamically changing world.
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